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THE INCIDENTS OF IRREGULAR
INCORPORATION.
In a recent number of this Magazine' the writer called
attention to certain fundamental questions in regard to the
legal status of corporations upon which the authorities are
divided. Among the problems at that time referred to as
illustrations of the conflict of authority, were those which
arise when a number of persons engage in business under
corporate form but without complying with all the formalities
prescribed by the law under which they are associated. Can
a creditor who has dealt with these persons as a corporation
take advantage of the defect in organization and treat the
associates as partners ? What shall be said of a case in which,
for the sake of gaining a limited liability, a business man com-
plies with the letter of a corporation law, but not with its
spirit, by associating with himself the requisite number of
"men of straw," thus obtaining a charter in pursuance of an
attempt to put a corporate name between himself and his
creditors ? Can those who, with intent to form a corporation,
engage in business before the corporate charter is obtained,
subsequently escape personal liability for debts contracted
before the grant of the charter, in virtue of their unexecuted
intention to become a corporation? Again, can a corporation
when sued upon one of its obligations set up the irregularity
of its own organization as a defence to the suit? If, as a-
plaintiff, the corporation sues to enforce an obligation, is it
liable to be met with a defence based upon the irregularity of
its organization ? Questions such as these are of such great
practical importance that we *cannot long rest satisfied with the
doubtful answers given to them by the courts. The commer-
cial world has a right to demand that our legal doctrines shall
be more definite.
As a modest contribution to the cause of uniformity the
following considerations are submitted to the profession. In
submitting them, it is not improper to suggest that much of
'Vol. 2, N. S. (May, 1895), p. 296.
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the confusion found in the reported decisions results from a
failure to treat the problem in its entirety. There is a tendency
to deal with the case which happens to be before the court as
if it presented an isolated question, to be answered independ-
ently of other questions which are rarely akin to it. Again,
it may be suggested that much of the criticism which has been
indulged in at the expense of the courts has been an unintelli-
gent and, in some instances, a perverse criticism. The House
of Lords, in Brodetinp v. Salomon, ' has recently decided, in the
case of one who had abused the privilege of limited liability
offered by the Companies Acts, while keeping within the letter
of the statutes, that there are no means of legally ascertaining
the motives and intentions of persons forming limited liability
companies under those enactments. At the time of the render-
ing of a different decision in the court below, the New York
Times called attention to the judgment as an instance of
"actual and substantial justice enforced by British Courts
without regard to any narrow technicalities that would seem to
-interfere with such justice." The writer of an interesting
editorial in a recent issue of that journal expresses the opinion
that this tribute of praise was "premature." He can "recall
no single American case in which a deliberate scheme for
seizing assets and avoiding payment has so completely suc-
ceeded in this country," and he observes that "if this abuse
be not corrected 'limited liability' under English law must
be changed to ' unlimited authority to cheat.' " While such
a criticism has the value which belongs to protest and
-expostulation, it is not as helpful as it would be if it had
undertaken to dispose of the reasons advanced by the
House of Lords for the decision and to suggest a more
satisfactory line along which future development might take
place. Finally, it seems to the writer that something has
been lost by the failure of the courts to face a problem which
is believed to be by far the most important of those which
obstruct the path of the student of corporation law. The
problem concerns our common law tendency to undertake the
'The House of Lords, in so deciding, reversed the decision of the Court
.of Appeal as reported in L. R. Ch. [1895] 323. This case will be discussed
n a sequel to the present article.
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adjustment of the relations between corporations and the
state in suits between the corporations and private citizens. If
a corporation is sued upon its contract, instead of treating the
case as if it arose between individuals, we complicate the
question of rights under the contract by raising the inquiry as
to the corporate power of the corporation to make such an
agreement as that which the court is asked to enforce. Why?
"Because public policy demands that corporate activity shall
be confined within well-defined limits." If this is the dictum
of public policy, why subject the unfortunate individual who
has contracted with the corporation to the tfouble and loss
incident to a vindication in his suit of the rights of an out-
raged public? If the state really has a restriction which it is
important to enforce, why not deal with the corporation
directly in a proceeding instituted for the very purpose? The
law of ultra vires would then become exclusively a branch of
public law, and ultra vires cases would be, as they ought to
be, cases in which the state is a party and the corporation a
defendant. We are gradually coming to the conclusion that
the business of supervising corporations and their operations.
is primarily a legislative and executive matter and not a judi-
cial one. We are electing boards of railroad commissioners.
We are creating insurance departments with insurance com-
missioners to preside over them. We have banking depart-
ments and examiners to exercise visitatorial functions. Why
not carry out this excellent modern development to its legiti-
mate conclusion and suffer the question of abuse of corporate
power to be raised only in proceedings instituted by the state
at the instance of the appropriate officer? Undoubtedly, the-
economic as well as the legal tendency is in this direction..
The discussion of the limits of corporate power in suits to
which individuals are parties has not been on the whole a,
creditable chapter in the development of our jurisprudence.
Not only in regard to the exercise of corporate power but
also as respects questions of irregularity of organization, this
great problem of the policy of the state is constantly present-
ing itself for solution. Why complicate the litigation to.
which John Doe is a party by discussing the difficult ques-
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tion whether or not his adversary, the corporation, has satis-
factorily discharged its duties to the state? If John Doe
dealt with the corporation as such, let us decide the case
upon the assumption that we have before us a .corporation de
jure. Let us not say with some courts that John Doe is
"estopped to deny that his adversary is a corporation." In
order that good may come, we must not do the very serious
evil, which is involved in using the term " estoppel " with
reference to a case from which certain necessary elements of
an estoppel are absent. Let us rather be bold enough to
recognize that commercial necessity has crystallized into a
rule of law, and that when John Doe enters into a contract
with those who are trading under corporate form, it will be
taken to be a term of his contract that the associates shall be
held to a limited liability only. If it is objected that in this
way irregular bodies will 6 e spawned upon the public and
that individuals without a charter and freed from the burdens
of corporate taxation will be enabled to claim the benefit of
limited liability, the answer is obviously a simple one. Make
the laws relating to the formation of corporations as strict as
you please. Place as many safe-guards as you will around
the exercise of corporate franchises. Punish the usurpation
of corporate power without a charter as severely as the exi-
gencies of the situation demand. Do not rest content with a
judgment of ouster. If necessary, subject to fine and impris-
onment those who attempt to rob the state of a portion of its
prerogative. But do not work injustice to John Doe or to
the associates with whom he has gone to law, by obscuring
the issues raised between them through the introduction into
the litigation of a consideration of the relation between the-
associates and the state.
In the following pages it is proposed briefly to summarize
the answers given by the courts to the problems of irregular
incorporation mentioned above. A subsequent paper will be
devoted to an attempt to exhibit the operation of the sug-
gested theory, which, in effect, banishes the learning of de
facto corporations from the realm of private litigation.
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I.
A SURVEY OF THE DECISIONS.
If we look into the books we find that problems of irregular
-organization have grouped themselves, roughly, into four
classes: (I) Cases in which associates are resisting a claim
preferred against them as partners; (2) Cases in which the
alleged corporation, or one of its members, is seeking to escape
liability by setting up a defect in organization; (3) Cases in
which a defendant is seeking to escape liability to a corpora-
tion by setting up irregularites in its organization; (4) Cases
in which the question is whether irregularities in the organiza-
tion of joint-stock companies will subject the associates to
general partnership liability.
I. Cases in which associates are resisting a claim preferred
,against them as partners.
The exemption from general partnership liability may be
claimed either (a) in virtue of a limitation imposed by contract,
or (b) in virtue of a charter obtained by the associates after
their business dealings with the plaintiff had begun, or (c) in
virtue of a charter obtained before the cause of action sued
upon arose.
(a.) B., C. and D. are general partners. They contract a
debt to A., A. agreeing to look only to the partnership property"
in satisfaction of his claim. In such a case the limitation will
be held valid and A. will have no right of recourse to the sepa-
rate property of the associates.'
(b.) Where the charter is obtained after the associates have
begun business dealings with the plaintiff, it may be that the
debt in suit was contracted pending an unexecuted intention
to become incorporated or it may have been contracted after
the granting of the charter. In the latter case the result may
be affected by the regularity or irregularity of organization
.under the charter.
B., C. and D. associate themselves together with the intention
-of obtaining a charter. They begin business and contract a
debt to A. Afterwards the charter is obtained, but A. sues
I Brown v. Slate Co., 134 Mass. 590, 1883. See also Lindley on Com-
panies, 246, and cases there cited.
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one or more of the associates to enforce a general partnership
liability. Judgment for A.'
B., C. and D. engage in business as general partners. A.
deals with them as such, giving them credit and receiving
payment from time to time. The associates procure a charter
of incorporation and regularly organize thereunder. After-
wards a debt is contracted to A., who sues B., C. and D. as
partners. According to a dictum in Martin v. Fewell, suipra,
A. cannot recover if he had actual notice of the incorporation.
Otherwise he can. Qucere, upon the theory of notice, whether
compliance with the requirements of a general corporation law
is not cbnstructive notice, in all jurisdictions in which adver-
tisement and recording are essential?
B., C. and D. engage in business as general partners. A.
deals with them as such, giving them credit and receiving pay-
ment from time to time. The associates procure a charter of
incorporation and irregularly organize thereunder. Afterwards
a debt is contracted to A. who sues B., C. and D. as partners.
If, in spite of the irregularities, there is a law under which
incorporation might be effected, a bonafide attempt to organize
under that law and a user of its privileges, the organization
will be treated as a de facto corporation and A. cannot
recover. 2
(c.) Where the debt in suit was contracted after the obtain-
ing of a charter and the plaintiff subsequently discovers
irregularities in the organization, the question arises whether
he can treat the charter as a nullity and hold the defendants
liable as general partners. In such cases it may be that the
charter was granted by special act or that organization was
sought to be effected under a general law. In either case it
may be that no law is proved to exist under which organiza-
tion could be effected, or that the law is unconstitutional, or
that the organization under the law has been defective and has
not been followed by user, or that the organization, though
defective, has been followed by user.
' Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401, 1883; Eliot v. Himrod, io8 Pa. 569,.
x885 (dictum).
2Eliot v. Himrod, supra (dictum). The theory of de facto corpora- -
lions will be discussed presently.
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B., C. and D. obtain a special act of incorporation. There is
a defect in the act or in the organization under it, or both. A.
deals with the association after organization. He subsequently
discovers the irregularity and sues B., C. and D. as partners.
He cannot recover. The reason for the decision is thus stated
by Parsons "A de facto is an illegal corporation, because
the incorporation was not effected according to law. The
color of authority for the existence of such a corporation is
derived from tradition. When the franchise was a direct
grant made by the Executive or Legislative department, the
charter was deemed the act of a co-ordinate branch of the
Government and, in deference to the Political Power, was
treated as a judgment which could not be impeached collater-
ally."
B., C. and D., attempt to organize under a general law, but
fail to comply with certain formalities. They do business as
a corporation and contract a debt to A., who seeks to enforce
partnership liability against them. A. is entitled to recover.
2
This decision is thus explained by Parsons 3  "The prohib-
ition by Constitution of special grants and the statutory
regulation of incorporation has made it subject to judicial
-cognizance and has changed the character of incorporation
from a Public to a private transaction. The incorporation has
become and is now the act of the incorporators. In cases of
incorporation under general statutes the Executive department
of the Government is powerless to prevent the incorporation.
Its action is purely ministerial . . .The corporator, like the
.special partner, claims exemption from the full measure of the
liability which, by the common law, attaches to his acts . . .
In each case immunity must be proved, for it is a universal
principle that he who claims a special privilege must make out
the exception upon which he relies. The burden of proof
rests upon him and is the condition of his right. If the law
has prescribed the requisites, nothing short of compliance with
the requisites of the law will be sufficient to establish the
exceptional privileges."
1 Partnership (James Parsons) p. 24.
2 Paterson v. Arnold, 45 Pa. 410, 1863.
3 P. 24.
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-13., C. and D. attempt to organize as before. The organi-
2ation under the general law is defective and A., a subsequent
creditor, sues the associates as partners. A. cannot recover.'
The reason given for the decision is the practical inconvenience
of subjecting stockholders to the risk of partnership liability. If
it is objected 2 that hardship proves too much, since at the
common law a partner was charged even if he took no part in
-the business, the answer is that the rule of partnership is not
adapted to the modem form of commercial and industrial activ-
ity of which the corporation is a type.
B., C. and D. go through the forms of corporate organi-
zation and do business as a corporation. At the end of
twenty-one years, A., a creditor, sues the associates as partners
and calls upon them to prove their charter as a condition of
immunity from personal liability. The lapse of time relieves
the associates from the obligation of proving their charter 3
B., C. and D. do business in corporate form and hold them-
,selves out as a corporation. A. deals with the organization,
which becomes indebted to him and he brings suit against B.,
C. and D. as partners. A. fails to prove that the defendants
are a partnership by contract or by holding out. It is con-
,ceded, however, that they have traded together as co-proprie-
tors of the property and business. They point to no general
law under which they could be incorporated and prove no
special act erecting them into a corporation. Upon this state
of the evidence, judgment is entered for the defendants
Qucare, in view of this decision, as to what becomes of the
-common law theory that the burden rests upon joint traders
to prove the existence of the privilege in virtue of which they
claim immunity from personal liability?'
I Cochran v. Arnold, 58 Pa. 399, 1868, (overruling Paterson v. Arnold,
sup ra.)
2 Parsons, P. 24.
'White v. State, 69 Ind. 273, 1879 (semble). This was a criminal pro-
ceeding for a trespass committed upon land held in the corporate name.
The defence was that the so-called corporation had no valid charter. The
court was of opinion that after the lapse of twenty-five years the question
-of corporate existence could not be raised except by the State.
4 Hallstead's Appeal, 157 Pa. 59, 1893.
5See Luckombe v. Ashton, 2 Fos. & Fin. 705; Greenwood's Case, 3
De G. M. & G. 459.
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B., C. and D. organize a corporation under a law which A.,.
a subsequent creditor, seeks to have declared unconstitutional..
The statute is pronounced unconstitutional, and A. is per-
mitted to hold the associate's liable as genera,- partners.'
B., C. and D. irregularly organize under a valid law. A..
deals with them as a corporation, but subsequently sues them
as individuals. Provided that there has been user and that.
the irregularity did not occur with reference to an essential
prescription of the statute, A. is held not to be entitled to
recover. What statutory prescriptions are and what are not
essential is often a difficult and disputable question of fact.
What constitutes user in a particular case is also a question,
likely to give trouble.2
Provided the irrtegularity is not " so great as to be fatal"
and provided there has been user, the denial of A.'s right to.
recover from the associates as partners is based upon different
grounds in different jurisdictions. In Pennsylvania and in,
many other States, the basis of the decision was, at first, the
hardship which would result from any other rule.' In a
Massachusetts case, decided in 185 1, the doctrine that
thie associates are liable as partners was said to be "quite
novel and somewhat startling." ' Morawetz argues that if'
corporators are charged as partners in a de facto corpora-
tion, the members of a de Jure corporation must also be
charged as partners as respects its ultra vires acts. Par-
sons answers that those agents of a corporation who unite
in making or authorizing an ultra vires contract are per-
sonally liable, but that the other members of the corporation.
are not liable, because, on principles of agency, no corporate
obligation is created. When a tort is not incident to the
business defined by the charter, it stands upon the footing
'Harriman v. Southam, I6 Ind. 19o, 1861 (semble); Heaston v. Rail-
road Co., 16 Ind. 275, 186I (semble). The theory of such cases is that
where power is conferred by statute the plaintiff is estopped by his con-
tract from raising the question of the regularity of its exercise. Aliter
where the statute, being invalid, confers no power.
2
See, for example, Methodist Church v. Pickett, i9 New York, 482i
1859; Railroad Company v. Cary, 26 New York, 75, i862--especially the
dissenting opinion of Allen, J. ; and Kaiser v. Bank, 56 Iowa, 104, I881
3 Cochran v. Arnold, sup ra.
4 Bigelow, J., in Fay v. Noble, 7 Cushing, 188.
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'of an ultra vires contract. If it is incident to the business,
the corporation is charged, but the tort feasor is subject to an
ultimate liability to reimburse the corporation. "The abuse
by the agent of his authority charges the principal because
the authority exists. The act of a person who has no
authority charges him because he is a principal." In New
Jerser and elsewhere A. is said to be estopped to deny that
B., C. and D. are a corporation. "The company was a cor-
poration de facto and the plaintiffs who contracted with it can-
not be permitted to deny the legality of its existence. The
State alone can call that in question." I This seems to be a
sound conclusion, but it is difficult to find in the case the ele-
ments of an estoppel. Since in such a case, it is the asso-
,iates who are alleging the estoppel (if any exists), it is some-
-times argued. that knowledge of the existence of the charter
-on the part of the plaintiff is essential to the validity of the
defence. In the absence of proof of any such knowledge the
.Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have said of a plaintiff that
he was amply justified in dealing with the associates as part-
ners, and he was, therefore, entitled to hold them liable as
such. This was said in a case in which an essential prescrip-
tion of the corporation act (recording of the charter) had been
-disregarded; but the court remarked "it may be conceded
that had plaintiff dealt with defendants as a corporation, he
would have been estopped from claiming against them in any
other capacity, even though they failed to record their
-charter." 2
When we glance back over the cases which range them-
selves in the first of the classes under discussion, we perceive
that associates who are sued as partners may assert an immu-
nity from individual liability if they can point to an express
.,contract by which the plaintiff has agreed to confine his right
-of recourse to the common property or fund. We further
perceive that the associates (in the absence of any express con-
tract) can successfully assert this immunity wherever it appears
that the associates held themselves out as a corporation and
1Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. Iaw, 599, I886.
- Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. 3o3, x893.
28 THE INCIDENTS OF IRREGULAR INCORPORATION.
dealt with the plaintiff on that basis. This last propositiorr,
however, must be qualified by the statement that in most
jurisdictions the burden rests upon the associates to show the
existence of a valid law under which they might be incorpo-
rated and a bona fide assumption and exercise of corporate
privileges, as if in virtue of such incorporation. The difficulty
-and confusion which exist in the cases arise chiefly from the.
impossibility of making satisfactory generalizations in regard
to what constitutes a colorable compliance with statutory
requirements and what amounts to a user of corporate privi--
leges. If it were not for these troublesome modifications it
might be said that, -as between the parties to an ordinary com-
mercial transaction, the law will recognize the possibility of
"incorporation by conduct "-working out the rights and
liabilities of all private parties in interest as if no vexed ques-
tion remained to be settled between the associates and the-
state. The most weighty reason assigned for insisting upon
the preservation of the "troublesome modifications " above
referred to, is the reason that in this way alone can safeguards
and restrictions be placed upon the exercise of the valuable
franchises and privileges which are in the gift of the state.
The validity of this reason must be considered hereafter.
2. Cases in which the alleged corporation or one of its mem-
bers is seeking to escape liability by setting up a defect in organi-
zation.
Cases belonging to this class may be grouped under two.
subdivisions; (a) cases in which the corporation is named as
defendant in the suit, and (b) those in which an individual is,
named as defendant, his liability to the plaintiff depending
upon his membership in the corporation in question.
(a) A. brought suit against B., an alleged corporation, upon
certain promissory notes purporting to be the notes of B.
B.'s defence was that there was a material and deliberate mis-
statement of fact in the recorded certificate of organization
required by the general law, that the legal prescription in
respect to publication had not been complied with, and
that, in taking its name, B. had violated another provision
of. the act by adopting a name identical with that of a then
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existing corporation. Judgment for A. Of the first defence
the court said that B. was estopped by the record; of the
second, it was observed that "however this omission might
have affected the corporation had they been plaintiffs, . . .
we think the corporation cannot set it up as a defect in their
organization to defeat a recovery hgainst them;" and of the
third, it was remarked that, as regards the creditors of the
company, an omission to comply with the terms of the statute
would furnish no defence. "Objections like these are cer-
tainly not to be favored when made by a company holding
themselves out as a corporation and contracting liabilities as
such."'
(b) A. brought an action of contract against the X. Co.
The defendant was defaulted, and B. and others were sum-
moned as stockholders in pursuance of certain provisions of
the law imposing upon the stockholders of manufacturing cor-
porations a liability for the corporate debts. It was contended
on behalf of B. that the X. Co. had no legal existence inas-
much as no articles of agreement as required by the statute
had ever been entered into. Judgment for B. "It is not a
case of defective organization under a charter or act of incor-
poration nor of erroneous proceedings after the necessary
steps were taken in the assumption of corporate powers, but
there is an absolute want of proof that any corporation was
ever called into being which had the power of contracting
debts or of rendering persons liable therefor as stockholders." 2
The X. Co., alleged to have been incorporated under an
act for the incorporation of ocean steamship companies, gave
promissory notes to A. Subsequently, B. became a s'ock-
holder in the company. Thereafter A. recovered judgment
upon the notes in a suit against X., but failed to obtain satis-
faction out of the corporate treasury. He then sought to
enforce a statutory liability against B. to an amount equal to
the stock held by him. B.'s defence was that io per cent. of
the capital stock was not paid in, although the act required
such payment. The X. Co. had elected officers, opened an
I Dooley v. Cheshire Glass Co., 15 Gray, 494, 186o.
2 Utley v. Union Tool Co., ii Gray, 139, 1858.
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office and had gone into actual operation as a corporation.
Judgment for A. The Court reasoned that if A. had broken
his contract and had been sued by the corporation, a defence
based upon the non-existence of the corporation would have
been sufficiently answered by a production of the certificate
which had been filed and proof of user (if not of user alone).
"When its corporate existence had been thus established, the
plaintiffs would not have been permitted to prove, as a defence
for them, the facts relied upon by the defendant for the famil-
iar reason that the right of a corporation to sue cannot be
inquired into collaterally." '
The net result of the cases belonging to this class seems
to be that under no circumstances can the corporation set up
its own irregularities by way of defence and that in no case
can an individual member of a corporation deny the corporate
existence where, if he were sued as a general partner, he
would be entitled to assert an immunity from individual lia-
bility. The former result is simple and satisfactory. A simi-
lar remark would be applicable to the latter result if the gen-
eral conditions of immunity from unlimited liability were
simplified in accordance with the suggestions put forth above.
3. Cases in which a defendant is seeking to escape liability to
a corporation plaintiff by setting up irregularities in its organ-
ization.
Cases falling within this class may be separated into two
subordinate classes; (a.)'cases in which the corporation is
suing a stranger to its organization, and (b.) those in which
the corporation is suing one of its own members upon a con-
tract of membership or of subscription.
(a.) B. contracted to make and deliver certain coaches to
A., an alleged corporation. B. broke his contract and A.
brought suit. B.'s defence was that there had been a failure
to pay into the corporate treasury io per cent. of the capital
stock as prescribed by the act. A. produced a regular certifi-
cate of incorporation and introduced evidence of user. Judg-
ment for A.'
I Eaton v. Aspinwall, ig New York, i19, 1859.
2 Eaton v. Aspinwall, ig New York, "g, i859 (dictum).
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A. did business under corporate form, and purported to
have complied with the requirements of the general law. B.
gave A. a promissory note, and after B.'s death A. sued B.'s
executor upon the note. Judgment for A. "The plaintiff
being a corporation de facto, and the defendant having con-
tracted with it as such, the legality of its organization cannot
be impeached by him when sued upon his contract."'
(b.) A., a religious corporation, sued B. to recover a sub-
scription towards rebuilding the plaintiff's church. There was
a general law authorizing the incorporation of churches at the
date of A.'s organization. At the trial A. gave in evidence a
certificate which was claimed by the defendant to be defective,
in that it did not show compliance with the terms of the act.
A. also introduced evidence for the purpose of establishing
user. Judgment for A. "It has been repeatedly held that
as against all persons who have entered into contracts with-
bodies assuming to act in a corporate capacity, it is sufficient
for such bodies to show themselves to be corporations defacto.
This cannot be done by simply showing that they have actcd
as corporations for any period of time, however long. Two
things are necessary to be shown in order to establish the ex-
istence of a corporation de facto, viz : I. The existence of a
charter or some law under which the corporation with the
powers assumed might lawfully be created; and, 2. A user by
the party to the suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by
such charter or law." A majority of the court were of
opinion that defects in the certificate were "only available in
behalf of the sovereign power of the State," and that the
evidence introduced was sufficient to establish the fact of user.
Two of the court, without committing themselves upon either
of these points, were of opinion that the certificate was in fact
sufficient.'
A. purported to be a corporation organized under a general
law. B. became a subscriber to its capital stock and paid an
instalment thereon. B. died and his administrator failed to
1 Bank v. McDonald, 13o Mass. 264, 188i. See also Appleton Insurance
Co. v. Jesser, 5 Allen, 446, 1862; Commissioner of Douglas v. Bolles, 94
U. S. io4, 1876.
2 Methodist Church v. Pickett, 19 New York, 482, 1859.
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pay subsequent calls. A. sued the administrator, who de-
fended on the ground that A.'s organization was defective in
that the affidavit annexed to the articles of association did not
contain a certain allegation required by the statute. Judg-
ment for A. A majority of the court concurred in an opinion
which contained this language : "I am of opinion that under
this and similar general acts for the formation of corporations,
if the papers filed, by which the corporation is sought to be
created are colorable, but so defective that in a proceeding
upon the part of the State against it, it would for that reason
be dissolved, yet by acts of user under such an organization
it becomes a corporation de facto, and no advantage can be
taken of such defect in its constitution collaterally by any
person." Two judges dissented; one expressed no opinion.'
B. signed an agreement of subscription to the stock of A.
The court construed the agreement as a contract to pay the
amount of the subscription to a corporation to be thereafter
organized and brought into existence. A. sued B. upon the
agreement. It appeared that the certificate of incorporation
had never been filed in the office of the Secretary of State as
required by statute. Judgment for B. "The contract was
in legal effect that the defendant would take and pay for the
stock subscribed for in. case the organization should be per-
fected and the corporation brought into legal existence and
not otherwise." " The filing of the certificate in the office of
the Secretary of State is an indispensable pre-requisite to the
legal existence of the corporation." 2
A survey of the cases belonging to this class seems to indi-
Z.ate that in almost every instance the corporatio will be per-
mitted to recover if it has a de facto existence./Here, again,
we are met with the difficulty of determining in a given case
what amounts to colorable compliance with the provisions of
a statute and what amounts to user. The exceptional case,
represented in the above outline by Indianapolis Furnace Co.
v. Nlerkimer, is the case in which the formation of a corpora-
tion is a condition of the defendant's liability. In such a case
I Buffalo R. R. Co. v. Carey, 26 New York, 75, 1862.
2Indianapolis Furnace Co. v. Herkimer, 46 Indiana, 142, 1874.
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there must be a regular and valid organization or the defend-
ant will never be liable. The reason given Is that under such
circumstances "the rule of estoppel does not apply," as it
would in case of a contract with an existing corporation. It
has been seen that, even in the case of an existing corpora-
tion, the elements of estoppel are lacking in such a transac-
tion, and, therefore, the reason assigned in cases of the kind
under consideration is peculiarly unsatisfactory.
4. Cases in which the question is whether irreguilarities in
the organization of joint stock companies will subject the asso-
dates to general partnership liabilio,.
In view of the fact that statutes have been passed in a mul-
titude of jurisdictions authorizing the formation of joint stock
companies with limited liability, the question was certain to
arise as to whether a stockholder in case of irregular organi-
zation could set up the defence that the company had acquired
a de facto existence. On looking into the books, we find that
this question was definitely raised in at least one case and that
the court answered it in the negative. The writer has not
found any extended discussion of the principles which should
underlie such a decision. It might be argued that, in the case
of the corporation, the test of its existence is the creation of a
legal entity by the state, whereas in the case of a joint-stock
company, there is no entity separate and apart from the mem-
bers that compose the association. On the basis of this dis-
tinction, it might be contended that where, in consequence of
the acts of the corporators, a plaintiff has shown his willing-
ness to make a contract with the entity, he can never recover
on that contract against any one but the entity-which, for
the purposes of private litigation, will be taken to exist,
although its existence might be disputed by the state. On
the other hand, in the case of the joint-stock company, it
might be said the plaintiff has made no contract with an entity,
but has contracted directly with the individuals who compose
the company, although, for convenience, they have acted with
a common name. In this view, the plaintiff would be entitled
to enforce against them whatever liability attaches by law to
contracts made by them-and this liability is unlimited liabil-
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ity, unless the members have satisfied the conditions upon
which immunity is offered by the State. It would follow that
there is no room for the conception of defacto existence in the
case of a joint-stock company, because, even when the "com-
pany" exists dejure, it has no existence apart from the mem-
bers which compose it. This argument is somewhat weakened
by the consideration that, in equity, the civil law theory is
universally followed to the extent that, in the case of the
ordinary partnership, the " firm" is treated as an entity dis-
tinct from its members This conception of the firm is gain-
ing ground even in the courts of common law,' and in propor-
tion to the definiteness with which it is accepted, the difficulty
,of making a theoretical distinction between the corporation
and the joint-stock company steadily increases. The explana-
tion above suggested, however, is probably a correct explana-
tion from the historical point of view. Whether any useful
purpose is subserved by maintaining a distinction between
joint-stock companies and corporations is a question which
seems to be least open to discussion. If, in the onward sweep
of legal development, the distinction is obliterated, it seems to
be quite certain that the results of irregular organization in the
case of joint-stock companies will be assimilated to the results
reached in the case of corporations, and not vice versa.
The case referred to as deciding that there can be no such
thing as a de facto joint stock company is Eliot v, ,Yimrod..
In this case A. brought suit on two notes given by B. and C.
for money borrowed. To defeat recovery, B. and C. alleged
that prior to the giving of the notes they had formed a partner-
ship association or joint-stock company under the Pennsyl-
vania Act of Legislature of June 2, 1874. It appeared that
there had been a failure on the part of B. and C. to comply
-with the requirements of the statute in certain essential par-
ticulars. They had, however, conducted the business for a
.considerable period of time and they contended that the
lJessl, M. R., in Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. D. 458, 476, 1877.
2 Brewer, J., in Cross v. Burlington National Bank, 17 Kan. 336, 34o,
1876; Barret, J., in Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt. 668, 1878; Cooley, J., in
Robertson v. Corsett, 39 Mich. 777, 784, 1878.
3io8 Pa. 569, 1885.
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existence of the partnership association could not therefore be
inquired into collaterally. "The formation of a limited
partnership," said the court, "is materially different from the
creation of a corporation. Such association is treated in the
statute as a partnership, which, upon the performance of
certain acts, shall possess specified rights and immunities. In
contemplation that the association may consist of many
members, for convenience it is clothed with many of the
feat ures and powers of a corporation, such as the right to sue
and be sued, grant an-''receive, in the association name. But
no man can purchase the interest of a member and participate
in the subsequent business, unless by a vote of the majority of
the members in number and value of their interests. No
charter is granted to the persons who record their statement.
When they are sued for debt and claim immunity founded on
such statement, it is competent for the plaintiff either to point
to a fatal defect on its face, or to prove that an essential
requisite, though formally stated, is falsely stated." 1 It will
be perceived that the court here points to the delectus person-
arum as distinguishing the joint-stock company from the
corporation. There have been, however, corporations the
shares of which were not generally transferrable and joint-
stock companies where the delectus personarum did not exist.
We have now completed our survey of typical decisions
upon the subject of irregular organization. We find them
complicated not only by the existence of the distinction, just
discussed, between corporations and joint-stock companies,
but by the presence of the vexed question as to what consti-
tutes colorable compliance with statutory requirements and
what constitutes user of corporate privileges. We notice a
1 The scope of this article does not include a discussion of the interpre-
tation placed by the courts upon the statutes which exist in several States
authorizing the creation of limited or special partnerships in which one
or more of the members is liable only to the extent of his contribution.
Such a statute is the Pennsylvania Act of March 21, r836. The necessity
of strict compliance with the terms of this statute has been emphasized
in a series of cases in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, culminating
in the somewhat startling decisions in Fourth Street National Bank v.
Whitaker, 170 Pa. 297, 1895, and Blumenthal Bros. & Co. v. Whitaker,
170 Pa. 309, 1895.
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marked tendency, in the case of alleged corporations, to con-
fine the plaintiff in his recovery to the corporate fund and,
where the corporation is suing, to preclude the defendant from
taking refuge behind an irregularity in the plaintiff's organiza-
tion. Have the limits of the tendency been reached ? Can
the courts safely go farther than they have gone in this direc-
tion ? Is there a tenable theory upon which the difficulties
which we now experience may be eliminated from private
litigation ? It is proposed to attempt to answer these ques-
tions in a subsequent article.
George fharton Pepper.
Philadelphia, Januaryxr, r897.
